A one-day expert review of a pre-production infotainment system

CEVT was developing the in-vehicle infotainment system for the new automotive brand that became Lynk & Co. Senior leaders wanted an independent view of the pre-production experience before the product moved further toward release.

I had one day of onsite access to the center-console hardware and software. This was an expert evaluation rather than a full usability study: the goal was to identify systemic risks quickly, show where deeper testing was needed, and give leadership a practical basis for action.

I independently inspected the system, documented screens and interactions, reviewed the experience against established human-factors and interaction-design principles, and produced a 33-page report with prioritized recommendations.

• Evaluated navigation, information architecture, touch behavior, feedback, consistency, and cognitive load
• Connected screen-level issues to driver attention, product quality, brand perception, and delivery risk
• Distinguished incomplete pre-production details from patterns that suggested deeper design and organizational problems
• Presented the findings and recommendations directly to senior management

The review found a busy, deeply nested interface with inconsistent patterns and an unusually high burden on the driver. Some screens behaved like desktop software translated to a touchscreen rather than an experience designed around quick recognition and low-attention interaction.

One striking symptom was the use of 62 popups, including 12 that were empty. Elsewhere, primary media screens exposed roughly two dozen choices at once, while inconsistent alignment and controls made the experience harder to scan and predict.

The report did not stop at a list of screen defects. The same inconsistencies appeared across navigation, terminology, feedback, layout, and touch behavior, suggesting that ownership and decision-making were fragmented across product, design, engineering, QA, and suppliers.

That changed the conversation. The risk was not simply that individual screens needed refinement; the product needed a clearer interaction model, stronger user-centered validation, and an organization capable of maintaining coherence across the system.

The roadmap combined immediate interface priorities with changes to product development:

• Redesign the interaction model for touch and the driving context
• Simplify navigation, reduce cognitive load, and establish consistent behavior across the system
• Test representative tasks with drivers instead of relying on specification compliance alone
• Give experience quality clear ownership and measurable success criteria
• Bring product, design, engineering, QA, and suppliers into a more integrated delivery model
• Use iterative development and validation to surface risks earlier

From the follow-up information I received, senior management treated the report as a wake-up call. The organization adopted most of the recommendations, reorganized the team, redesigned the system, and selected new hardware suppliers.

My involvement ended after delivering and presenting the review. I therefore do not claim authorship of the released interface or attribute individual production decisions to this work. The value of the engagement was making the scale and interconnected nature of the risks visible early enough for leadership to act.

A concentrated review can expose patterns that are difficult to see when teams are absorbed in delivery. It is not a substitute for sustained research or validation, but it can create the shared language and urgency needed to begin that work.

In this case, the most consequential contribution was connecting interface evidence to the product-development system behind it. That made the report useful not only to designers, but to the senior leaders who could change the team, suppliers, and direction.